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Abstract: Process disturbances can propagate over entire plants and it can be difficult to locate their root 
causes from observed effects. Bayesian Networks offer a way to represent unit operations, processes and 
whole plants as probabilistic models which can be used to infer and rank likely causes from observed 
effects. This paper presents a methodology to use deterministic steady-state process models to derive 
Bayesian Networks based on alarm event detection. An example heat recovery network is used to 
illustrate the model building and inferential procedures.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Modern process plants operate in demanding safety, 
environmental and economic conditions and comprise a range 
of interconnected chemical, mechanical, electrical and 
control operations and systems.  
Process disturbances affect both short-term production and 
long-term equipment condition, and the complexity of 
process interactions means that their root causes can be 
difficult to unravel, isolate and repair (Thambirajah, 
Benabbas, Bauer, & Thornhill, 2008). Within the process 
engineering and control communities there are a number of 
approaches to cause and effect analysis and disturbance 
diagnosis (for a review see Thornhill and Horch, 2007, and 
Yang, Duan, Shah and Chen, 2014). These approaches 
include the use of graph theory to model causal and 
connectivity relationships using process and instrumentation 
diagrams (P&IDs) and other drawing information (e.g. 
Maurya, Rengaswamy and Venkatasubramanian, 2004; Jiang, 
Patwardhan and Shah, 2009). 
Graph models are used in systems theory to demonstrate the 
existence of connectivity paths between distributed causes 
and effects (e.g. Deo, 1974). They can also be used in reverse 
to trace paths from effects to possible causes. This reversal 
property finds application in Bayesian Networks which 
model the probabilistic relationships between system 
variables as Directed Acyclic Graphs and are used to rank 
possible causes using observed effects (Murphy, 2012).  
Bayesian Network models have been applied to engineering 
condition monitoring (Marwala, 2012) and process systems 
(Yang, Duan, Shah and Chen, 2014), where time series data 
are used to infer the existence of a causal structure 
connecting process variables and fault states. In addition 
Yang et al. note that the physical explanation of Bayesian 
Network probabilities is not straightforward.  
Medjaher, Gouriveau and Zerhouni (2009) use Bond graphs 
to model the forward information flow around a dynamic 
system and generate residuals – which account for the 
discrepancies between the predicted state of a system and its 
observed state – to derive a Dynamic Bayesian network for 
prognostic analysis. 
Another research direction is based on the concept of 
structural equations (e.g. Lee, Christensen and Rudd, 1966) 
which illustrates an intuitive link between process unit 
operations, causality, and graphs.  
This paper addresses the question of how to derive Bayesian 
Networks which can be used for both diagnostic and 
prognostic analysis from process flow diagrams, 
deterministic models and structural equations, and gives a 
physically intuitive meaning to network probabilities based 
on observing process alarms. Section 2 presents a practical 
definition of a plant disturbance and explains the basic 
principles behind Bayesian Networks. A deterministic heat 
exchanger unit operation model is used to illustrate the 
derivation of a corresponding Bayesian unit operation. Using 
these Bayesian unit operations Section 3 builds an example 
process heat recovery system as a probabilistic model. The 
corresponding deterministic process model is used to 
simulate a process disturbance and the ensuing alarms. It is 
shown that the Bayesian Network can use alarm information 
to identify the most likely root cause. Finally section 4 
presents a brief discussion of the results. 
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2. METHODS 
As a teaching example Figure 1 shows a section of a heat 
recovery network, adapted from Kemp (2007). This process 
system is useful to illustrate the rationale and methods of 
Bayesian Network process cause and effect analysis.  The 
network comprises a set of heat transfer processes (circles) 
which act on the given upstream condition (boxes) to produce 
the required downstream conditions (arrowheads).  
 
Fig. 1.  Example Heat Recovery Network (Kemp 2007) 
Hot streams which require cooling traverse from left to right, 
and conversely cold streams that require heating traverse 
from right to left; X2, X3, X5 and X6 are counter-current 
heat exchangers. S1 is a hot stream source stream, S4 is a 
cold source stream, and MX is a two stream mixer. The 
original unit operation numbering has been preserved for 
referencing.  The network is designed to operate at a steady 
state, however in practice disturbances arise and propagate 
throughout the plant. Such disturbances result in downstream 
temperature changes and can come about because of 
variations in the upstream conditions, and the heat transfer 
performance of the individual exchangers. The operational 
problem is then to work out which upstream causes or heat 
exchangers contributed to the observed  downstream effects 
using the available information. 
2.1 Bayesian Modelling 
Bayesian Networks (Koller and Friedman, 2009; Murphy, 
2012) offer a way to model complicated systems 
probabilistically and use the evidence available in the 
downstream measurements to rank likely upstream causes for 
further investigation. 
An example of a Bayesian Network is that introduced by 
Pearl (1988) and adapted in Figure 2. This shows the causal 
links and conditional probability relationships between 
causes and effects in a simple system where F = FALSE and 
T = TRUE. 
From the conditional probability table associated with the 
“Wet Grass” variable, the probability of the grass being wet 
given that has been raining and the sprinkler has been on is 
0.99 or 99%.  
 
Fig. 2.  Example Bayesian Network 
Using the idea of structual equations (Lee, Christensen and 
Rudd, 1966) this probabilty network can be written as (1). 
The notation  Z means the Z  function has no external 
inputs so that R is an independent variable with a 
corresponding stand alone conditional probability table. 
     ,  ,  ,R S R G R SZ [ \              (1) 
where G = Grass Wet (TRUE/FALSE), S = Sprinkler On 
(TRUE/FALSE) and R = Raining (TRUE/FALSE).The 
probabilistic structural functions ,  ,  Z [ \  are defined by the 
conditional probability tables for each variable of Figure 2.  
Using the definitions of conditional probability and the 
probability chain rule the cause and effect question  
“Given that the grass is wet, what is the chance that it has 
rained?” 
can be modelled as (2) where details of how to evaluate the 
conditional probabilities are given in Pearl (1988).  
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This model does not account for the time sequence of the rain 
and sprinkler causes in generating the wet grass effect, and is  
said to be static (Murphy, 2012). Temporal information can 
be modelled using Dynamic Bayesian Networks to 
probabilistically relate time sequenced effects and causes 
(ibid). For both static and dynamic networks the primary 
source for building the conditional probability tables is 
experimental or observational data. For a process system, if 
these data are not initially available an alternative procedure 
is to generate the required statistics by driving deterministic 
models using noisy input data. In the case of dynamic 
  
     
 
systems this may involve the solution of a set of stochastic 
differential-transport delay equations (Jacobs, 2010).  
If however the initial focus of an investigation is the likely 
occurrence of causes given a set of observed effects around 
the nominal plant design steady-state, irrespective of their 
timing, the construction of the conditional probability 
relationships is simplified by the use of deterministic steady-
state models to derive static Bayesian Networks. A process 
operator can refine the results of a specific static Bayesian 
Network analysis by comparing the time-stamps of the 
potential causes with those of the observed effects. 
2.2 Disturbance Modelling 
Figure 3 shows a counter-current heat exchanger. Assuming 
that fluid heat capacities remain constant over the unit, (3), 
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Table 1.  Generalised Heat Exchanger Model Variables 
Variable Units Type Description 
CPc kW/oC Input Cold stream heat 
capacity 
CPh kW/oC Input Cold stream heat 
capacity 
θi oC Input Hot stream inlet 
temperature 
UA kW/oC Input Heat transfer coefficient 
Ti oC Input Cold stream temperature 
θo oC Output Hot stream temperature 
To oC Output Cold stream temperature 
UA kW/oC Input Heat transfer coefficient 
α,β,λ ------ ------- Intermediate variables 
The suffix “i” denotes “inlet” and the suffix “o” denotes 
“outlet”.  
 
Fig. 3. Heat Exchanger Unit Operation 
Equations (5) and (6) can be written as the deterministic 
structural equations (7) and (8) which make clear the input-
output causality of the heat exchanger. 
 , , , ,o i i c hf T CP CP UAT T            (7) 
 , , , ,o i i c hT g T CP CP UAT                                               (8) 
A two-stream stream mixing model is defined by (9)  
 
     1 1 2 2
3
1 2
T CP T CP
T
CP CP
                                       (9)
     
where T denotes stream temperature [oC] and CP denotes 
stream heat capacity [kW/oC] 
Equation (9) can be remapped to the structural form of (10) to 
highlight the input-output causal relationships. 
 3 1 2 1 2, , ,T h CP CP T T          (10) 
 A deterministic process system model can now be built by 
interconnecting unit operation models and stream properties.  
Moreover, such deterministic unit operations can be used to 
derive corresponding probabilistic disturbance models by 
using a Monte Carlo procedure whereby each unit operation 
function is evaluated using randomly sampled input data.  
In this work the values of the variables are modelled as 
normal distributions, although it is noted that Bayesian 
networks are distribution-independent.  
For a process variable x the set of measurements ( )x j  is 
assumed to be normally distributed about its set-point with a 
maximum range of , %m xr  such that 
,1( ) , 1,2...
100
m xrx j x j nr§ ·  ¨ ¸© ¹          (11) 
  
     
 
where x is the set-point of x. 
If the population standard deviation of x  is denoted by xV    
then assuming that a six sigma confidence interval accounts 
for practically all the data xV can be found from (12) and 
(13). 
 ,6 100m xx rx x xV § ·r  r ¨ ¸© ¹
?
                                                (12) 
 ,600m xx r xV § · ¨ ¸© ¹                                                                (13) 
Defining an alarm range variable ,a xr the control objective is 
to keep the process variable x within an alarm range bounded 
by ,a x xx r Vr . For each measurement  x j  an associated 
binary alarm variable ( )ax j is defined by (14) 
, ,0, ( )( )
1,  otherwise
a x x a x xx r x j x rax j V V­  d d  ®¯   (14) 
Further, from n  measurements of x  the probability that any 
randomly selected measurement  x k is in alarm is found 
from (15).  
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The procedure thus outlined can be applied to all the process 
variables that characterise Figure 1. In this paper for all such 
variables x, ,m xr  = 15 and ,a xr  = 2.  
The models defined by (3) – (15) are implemented in 
MATLAB. A sample size of n = 8000000 is chosen to 
generate statistically significant samples. Figure 4 and Tables 
2 and 3 illustrate the procedure for example data. 
The five input values in each column of Table 3 form 25 = 32 
possible distinct binary patterns, which can be denoted 
as 01b , 02b ... 32b .  
These data can now be used to form the conditional 
probability tables for the input-output alarm variables. As an 
example, for the binary pattern  0 0 0 0 001 Tb   
and the hot-side output temperature alarm variable ( )oa jT  
the conditional probability for the state 
   TRUE01 & ( ) 1ob a jT   is given by (16), (17) and 
(18) where & is the logical AND function. 
 
Table 2. Example Input-Output Data 
Variable Type Sample j 
1 … 752 … n 
θi Input 161.1 … 167.2 … 155.4 
Ti Input 36.93 … 36.78 … 37.19 
CPh Input 2.214 … 2.346 … 2.356 
CPc Input 0.947 … 0.972 … 0.953 
UA Input 1.226 … 1.195 … 1.172 
θo Output 126.2 … 132.4 … 124.6 
To Output 118.6 … 120.6 … 113.4 
 
 
Fig. 4. Heat Exchanger X3 Steady-State Design Basis 
 
Table 3.  Example Input-Output Alarms 
Variable Type Sample j 
1 … 752 … n 
aθi Input 0 … 1 … 0 
aTi Input 0 … 0 … 0 
aCPh Input 0 … 0 … 0 
aCPc Input 0 … 0 … 0 
aUA Input 0 … 0 … 0 
aθo Output 0 … 0 … 0 
aTo Output 0 … 0 … 0 
 
This procedure is applied to all the input patterns and output 
alarms states of Table 3 to derive a conditional probability 
table for the heat exchanger, and extended to all the unit 
operations of Figure 1 to derive a static Bayesian Network of 
the complete system. 
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2.3 Static Bayesian Network Implementation 
For this investigation the Microsoft Bayesian Belief Toolkit 
MSBNx (Microsoft Research, 2010) is used.  
For ease of implementation the mathematical notation of 
Table 1 is mapped onto one compatible with the MSBNx user 
interface as per Table 4, where the prefixes v, p and a refer to 
the deterministic process variable, the Bayesian probability 
that the variable is in alarm, and its actual deterministic alarm 
state respectively. 
In the heat recovery process variables are always associated 
with four basic physical quantities:  
CP ≡ Heat Capacity 
TH ≡ Hot Stream Temperature 
TC ≡ Cold Stream Temperature 
UA ≡ Heat Transfer Coefficient 
 




Heat Exchanger 3 Specific 
Instantiation 
Process Probability Alarm 
CPc vS4CP pS4CP aS4CP 
CPh vS1CP pS1CP aS1CP 
θi vS1TH pS1TH aS1TH 
UA vX3UA pX3UA aX3UA 
Ti vX2TC pX2TC aX2TC 
θo vX3TH pX3TH aX3TH 
To vX3TC pX3TC aX3TC 
 
The same principles are applied at the mixer MX downstream 
of the cold-side outlets of heat exchangers X5 and X6. The 
Bayesian representation of Heat Exchanger 3 can now be 
written as (19) and (20) 
1 , 2 ,  
3 Φ
1 , 4 , 3
pS TH pX TC
pX TH
pS CP pS CP pX UA
§ · ¨ ¸© ¹
        (19) 
1 , 2 ,  
3 Γ
1 , 4 , 3
pS TH pX TC
pX TC
pS CP pS CP pX UA
§ · ¨ ¸© ¹
        (20) 
where Φ  and Γ are defined by conditional probability tables 
generated using the procedure of Section 2.2.  
The Bayesian Network for Heat Exchanger 3 is shown in 
Figure 5 highlighting the connections to pX3TH.  
 
 
pS1TH pX2TC pS1CP pS4CP pX3UA
pX3TH pX3TC
 
Fig. 5. Heat Exchanger 3 Bayesian Network Connections 
The static Bayesian Network for the complete heat recovery 
system is now derived by building conditional probability 
tables for each process output alarm variable using the 
techniques just described, and interconnected in the same 
way as the deterministic network.  
 




     
 
Having built a complete heat recovery Bayesian Network its 
use as a diagnostic tool is now explored in Section 3. 
3. A WORKED EXAMPLE 
A useful property of a Bayesian model is that given a set of 
observed effects, also known as evidence, it can be applied to 
infer and rank possible causes (Pearl, 1988). A modelling 
demonstration based on the operation of Heat Exchanger 3 is 
now used to illustrate the principles of evidence and 
inference.  
For a process operator the state of the plant alarm log 
provides the evidence snapshot for use in the static Bayesian 
Network so as to work out the likely cause of a plant 
disturbance. 
In each of four example cases the full deterministic process 
model of Figure 1 is used to set the upstream source 
temperature vS1TH such that it is in alarm itself (aS1TH = 
TRUE), and is therefore a disturbance cause, and calculate 
the resulting process and alarm conditions in and around Heat 
Exchanger 3.   
The inference test is to use the observed process alarms to 
identify which of the possible process inputs is the probable 
source of the disturbance.  
However it is assumed that only a subset of the possible 
alarms can actually be observed so that knowledge of the 
process is limited. In the following analysis, the abbreviations 
O and U denote Observed and Unobserved alarms 
respectively. 
If an alarm can be observed then its state – TRUE or FALSE 
- is used as disturbance effect evidence and the Bayesian 
Network alarm probabilities recalculated to generate a 
relative ranking iRR for each possible causal alarm 
probability variable iaX as defined by (21) 
  min ii k
pXRR
pX
         (21) 
where i, k = 1,..5. 
Possible downstream alarm observations are constrained to 
be at aX3TC, aX6TH and aMXTC only, which denote the 
cold-side outlet temperature alarm of Heat Exchanger 3, the 
hot-side outlet temperature alarm of Heat Exchanger 6 and 
the outlet temperature alarm of the cold-stream mixer MX. 
The first case is a control experiment in which the process is 
in normal operation and no alarms are available for 
observation. In the second, third and fourth cases the 
temperature vS1TH is set so as to trigger alarm effects 
throughout the process. In each of these cases a set of alarms 
is available for observation and use in the Bayesian Network 
to generate hypotheses about the state of the process. 
 
3.1  Case No. 1 
For Heat Exchanger 3 in undisturbed operation the process 
state and possible observations are given in Tables 6 and 7.  
Table 6.  Case No. 1: Process Variables  
Variable Type Status Value 
vS1TH Cause  0159 C  
vX2TC Cause  0 C38  
vS1CP Cause  2.285 kW/K  
vS4CP Cause  2.285 kW/K  
vX3UA Cause  1.180 kW/K  
vX3TC Effect  0117 C  
vX6TH Effect  077 C  
vMXTC Effect  053 C  
 
Table 7.  Case No.1: Alarm Probabilities  
Variable Type Status Value 
pS1TH Cause U 4.56% 
pX2TC Cause U 4.55% 
pS1CP Cause U 4.55% 
pS4CP Cause U 4.56% 
pX3UA Cause U 4.57% 
pX3TC Effect U 5.35% 
pX6TH Effect U 7.29% 
pMXTC Effect U 1.96% 
 
The given probability values of pS1TH, pS1CP and pX3UA, 
are close to those expected from a 2V confidence interval on 
a normal distribution so that for a random measurement of 
vS1TH the chance of it being in alarm is around 4.6 %.  The 
tabulated values of pX6TC and pMXTC are both forward 
calculated from the Bayesian Network.  
3.2  Case No. 2 
The source stream temperature S1TH is now increased from 
0159 C to 0170 C.  Table 8 shows the resulting process state. 
The deterministic alarm variable aX6TH is now observed to 
be TRUE, the corresponding Bayesian variable pX6TH set to 
100% and the Bayesian Network recalculated in Table 9.  
  
     
 
The probability of vS1TH being in alarm has now increased 
to 24.8% and vS1TH is ranked as being the most probable 
disturbance cause with an RR of 5.3. 
Table 8. Case No. 2: vS1TH Increase 
Variable Type Status Value 
vS1TH Cause  0170 C  
vX2TC Cause  0 C38  
vS1CP Cause  2.285 kW/K  
vS4CP Cause  2.285 kW/K  
vX3UA Cause  1.180 kW/K  
vX3TC Effect  0124.2 C  
vX6TH Effect  0 C81.6  
vMXTC Effect  054.9 C  
aS1TH Cause U  
aX2TC Cause U  
aS1CP Cause U  
aS4CP Cause U  
aX3UA Cause U  
aX3TC Effect O TRUE 
aX6TH Effect O TRUE 
aMXTC Effect U  
 
Table 9.  Case No.2: aX6TH Evidence 
Variable Type Status Value RR 
pS1TH Cause U 24.8% 5.3 
pX2TC Cause U 4.68% 1 
pS1CP Cause U 13.9% 2.97 
pS4CP Cause U 4.75% 1.01 
pX3UA Cause U 4.82% 1.03 
pX3TC Effect U 16.2% - 
pX6TH Effect O 100% - 
pMXTC Effect U 4.75% - 
 
3.2  Case No. 3 
In this case the mixer outlet temperature vMXTC is observed 
to be not in alarm (aMXTC = FALSE). Therefore pMXTC 
can be set to 0% to yield Table 10.  Again vS1TH is ranked 
first, where RR = 4.99. 
Table 10. Case No. 3: aX6TH & aMXTC Evidence 
Variable Type  Status Value RR 
pS1TH Cause  U 23.3% 4.99 
pX2TC Cause  U 4.67% 1 
pS1CP Cause  U 14.1% 3.02 
pS4CP Cause  U 4.74% 1.01 
pX3UA Cause  U 4.80% 1.03 
pX3TC Effect  U 15.3% - 
pX6TH Effect  O 100% - 
pMXTC Effect  O 0% - 
Table 11.  Case No. 4: aX6TH, aMXTC, & aX3TC 
Evidence 
Variable Type Status Value RR 
pS1TH Cause U 84.7% 17.0 
pX2TC Cause U 4.98% 1 
pS1CP Cause U 6.53% 1.31 
pS4CP Cause U 6.49% 1.30 
pX3UA Cause U 5.88% 1.18 
pX3TC Effect O 100% - 
pX6TH Effect O 100% - 
pMXTC Effect O 0% - 
3.3  Case No. 4 
Finally assume the cold-side outlet temperature of heat 
exchanger 3, vX3TC, is in observable alarm to yield Table 10. 
From Table 11 pS1TH is still ranked first. In addition its RR is 
now 17.0, an increase of over threefold on the previous cases. 
This suggests that variable vS1TH is the most likely source of 
the disturbance.  
3.4 Hypothesis Testing 
The hypothesis that vS1TH is the most likely disturbance 
cause can be tested using the Bayesian Network in forward 
mode using the following procedure: build a Bayesian 
Network noisy logic gate (NLG) from the observed alarm 
states as per the specific example screenshot of Table 12.  
  
     
 
For each candidate root cause ivX (e.g. vS1TH, vS1CP & 
vS4CP) set 1.ipX  The NLG then calculates the probability 
of all the observed alarms occurring when the candidate root 
cause is in alarm, with the other candidate root causes are 
unobserved, so that the network is being used in a prognostic 
sense. The base case is the prior state of the NLG when the 
set of three candidate causes are all unobserved. 
Table 12. Bayesian NLG for observed alarm states 
 
Table 13. NLG output for given alarm states 
p(aNLG = TRUE ) 1.06% 
p(aNLG = TRUE | aS1TH = TRUE) 19.8% 
p(aNLG = TRUE | aS1CP = TRUE) 1.53% 
p(aNLG = TRUE | aS4CP = TRUE) 1.52% 
These data support the hypothesis that vS1TH is the most 
likely root cause. 
4. DISCUSSION 
The methods and results presented suggest static Bayesian 
Network analysis can be applied to disturbance cause and 
effect analysis of process systems. The Bayesian Network is 
constructed directly from the process configuration so that 
physical causality is inherent within the modelling. Moreover 
the network conditional probabilities are assigned based on 
the chance that a given process variable is disturbed with 
respect to easily defined and understood alarm limits.   
Because Bayesian Networks are distribution independent, a 
plant model can be primed with simulated data which is 
augmented with operational data as it becomes available. In 
this paper such prior data were calculated using steady-state 
process unit operation models driven by noise data to derive 
static Bayesian Networks.  
The use of the actual process configuration and the 
identification of probabilities with process alarm effects lends 
itself to the possible use of static Bayesian Networks at the 
process operator display level, making use of disturbance 
cause relative probability rankings to prioritise further 
investigation.  
In conclusion static Bayesian Networks derived from process 
configurations have a natural interpretation in relating 
observed causes to likely effects, and can be presented in a 
way that is useful to plant operators and engineers.   
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